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Consent to sex is a topic of much research, particularly with the goal of optimizing 
sex education for youth, college students, and military service personnel. Sex 
educators have tended to err on the side of clear and concise definitions of consent 
for ease of instruction.  However, the sexual science literature has steadily shown 
that the navigation of consent to sexuality activity is much more nuanced, situated 
and contextual.  When consent is conceptualized as a yes or no answer to particular 
sexual acts or sexual activity altogether, it overlooks the dynamic nature of how 
people experience consenting.  This article examines consent in the sexual science 
research literature and then considers these findings through the lens of some of the 
contributions of phenomenological philosophy.  We then discuss the experience 
of consent as a dialogic process that can lead to moments of transcendence of the 
self and deep reverence for the other, despite some moments of lack of clarity or 
ambiguity within the same sexual act.
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Consent is an important construct in the sexual science discourse.  It is one of the defining characteristics of healthy and 
legal sexual activity, as distinct from the various 
categories of pathological, criminal, and socially 
or relationally problematic sexual behavior (APA, 
2013; Department of Justice, 2017).  Concretely 
defining consent in the context of sexuality in 
practice, however, has been, and continues 
to be, challenging and elusive.  Current legal 
definitions are dependent on several other terms, 
not all of which have meanings that are universally 
understood.  Definitions of consent use words that 
can have subjective meanings such as: Capacity 
to consent; freedom from coercion; and, mutually 
understood agreement to engage in a sexual act 
(Department of Justice, 2017; Rape Abuse and 
Incest National Network, 2018).  When consent is 
applied and interpreted in legal discourse, it is often 
not without problems, lack of clarity, and significant 
consequence (Busch & MacGregor, 2009; Weiss, 
2010; West, 1996). 
Sex educators have strived to clarify, 
articulate and teach youth, college students, military 
personnel, and others, ways to assure that there is 
consent to sex prior to engaging in sexual activities 
(deFur, 2016a).  These same educators acknowledge 
that what they teach is necessarily simplified in 
order to help others gather a yes or no response 
to an entire sexual act, and is largely aligned with 
the need to prevent legal recourse (deFur, 2016b; A 
look at teaching sexual consent, 2016). 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders – 5 (APA, 2013) also puts forth a 
definition of paraphilic disorders, which are relevant 
for this discussion, as some of the paraphilias include 
desires for those who are unwilling or unable to give 
legal consent.  Discernment as to the meaning of 
terms within the definition of legal consent is also 
not always concretely clear for clinicians and is left 
to interpretation and assessment in cases of forensic 
and clinical practice (APA, 2013).  Sexual consent 
in practice between people outside of the legal and 
clinical realms, however, is also subject to various 
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 issues such as achieving intersubjective agreement 
through interpretation of meanings in the moment 
and without an outside other as arbiter.  It is this 
process of interpersonal consent navigation that will 
be the focus of this article. 
What follows includes a review of the sexual 
science literature on consent.  This review situates 
the concept of consent within the current discourse 
of sexuality, behavior, and research.  In order to 
consider the experience of sexual consent through 
phenomenological understandings, it is helpful to 
first identify how social scientists conceptualize 
consent.  We then discuss sexual consent from 
the philosophical perspectives of phenomenology, 
leveraging Husserl’s ideas of intentionality and 
Merleau-Ponty’s subsequent work on embodied 
intentionality.  We then offer a consideration of the 
I-Thou framework of transpersonal transcendence 
(Buber, 1932/1990) as potentially illuminating the 
experience of sexual consent as a dialogic process. 
We argue that sexual consent is a process that is 
lived through time as a series of moments, and not 
a static response given at a particular moment in 
time.  The way that consent is navigated as a lived 
experience through time, however, is inherently 
related to the structure of consciousness—as an 
embodied, relational, and temporal, activity, in a 
context or environment.  Because a person’s lived 
experience and their experience of the other and 
the environment is constantly changing with each 
passing moment, consent is a renewable act in each 
moment—an opportunity to engage consciousness 
in dialogue with the other at each moment and an 
opportunity to transcend the self through consensual 
sexual experiences.  
Before beginning, however, it is important to 
make the intentions and limitations of this discussion 
clear.  What follows deconstructs the meaning and 
process of sexual consent and will leave areas of 
ambiguity.  This should not be taken to imply support 
of non-consensual sexual activities, unwanted 
sexual activities, rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse, 
or rape culture.  This particular paper is an attempt at 
further understanding how consent occurs as a lived 
experience.  This discussion is distinct from the need 
to educate others or address the legal dimension of 
consent in a mechanical or applied fashion and as such 
is to be applied only to the self in a reflective manner 
by way of describing the lived experience of consent 
from a philosophical perspective.
Any theorizing about sexual consent should 
be considered with the utmost concern for the 
implications of those who may have diminished 
capacity, agency, or power in any given relational or 
structural dynamic—regardless of how challenging 
defining these groups or experiences may be.  In 
addition, sexuality itself, according to Dillon (1992), 
a phenomenologist who has written extensively 
on the subject, is described as “resid[ing] within 
a matrix of value-laden historically-situated ideas 
and emotions”—all of which imbue sexuality with 
meaning that is not necessarily inherent or universal, 
and therefore can be thematized and questioned 
(Dillon, 1992, p. 182).  Given its complexity and 
importance within relationships and the larger social 
and structural contexts in which it resides, it is with 
great reverence and humility that we approach the 
topic of sexual consent.
Sexual Consent in Sexual Science Research
Sexual consent is an important part of healthy sexual relationships that is gaining much 
attention in public discourse—especially in the 
college and university setting (Beres & MacDonald, 
2015).  Sexual consent in sexual science research 
has been discussed as taking many forms: an explicit 
agreement, a behavior indicative of willingness, 
a feeling or decision, a discrete event or as an 
ongoing/continuous process, something that must 
be given explicitly, or even something that can be 
assumed based on past behavior or relationship 
structure (Muehlenhard, Humphreys, Jozkowski, & 
Peterson, 2016), each with potential problems in 
lack of clarity.  Researchers of sexual consent have 
measured consent in a number of ways (Beres, 
2007; Humphreys & Brousseau, 2010; Jozkowski, 
Peterson, Sanders, Dennis, & Reece, 2014; 
O’Sullivan & Byers, 1996; Peterson & Muehlenhard, 
2007).  Throughout this discourse, there have been 
a number of proposed paradigms that frame the 
discussion about consent as a decision-making 
process.
In a report commissioned by the Sexuality 
Information and Education Council of the United 
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States (SIECUS), Muehlenhard (1995/1996) examined 
the complexities of consent and conceptualized it in 
two ways: A mental act and a verbal act.  The mental 
act is described as an internal decision about the 
willingness to engage or desire to engage sexually. 
The verbal act is the external concrete expression 
verbally to engage.  Muehlenhard (1995/1996) 
ultimately recognized both mental and verbal acts 
as problematic, as consent in practice is often 
obtained nonverbally (Beres, Herold, & Maitland, 
2004; Hall, 1998; Hickman & Muehlenhard, 1999; 
Jozkowski & Peterson, 2013; Jozkowski & Wiersma, 
2015; Muehlenhard, Powch, Phelps, & Giusti, 1992). 
These two ideas are later identified by researchers 
as two separate concepts and are decoupled from 
the verbal requirement. Jozkowski (2011) and 
Jozkowski and Weirsma (2015) discussed the ideas 
of internal and external consent, which allows for the 
process of non-verbal communication (Hickman & 
Muehlenhard, 1999) externally in addition to verbal 
communication.  In this model, consent is seen as an 
internal process of deciding whether or not to engage 
in a sexual activity as well as an external process of 
making that decision known to others in both verbal 
and non-verbal ways.  Muehlenhard et al. (2016) 
mentioned that people who are ambivalent about 
sex may be reluctant to discuss sex or avoid thinking 
about engaging in an activity, thus making both the 
internal and external processes more challenging. 
This experience of ambivalence, self-judgment or 
self-censure are crucial possibilities to consider 
when examining consent to sexual behavior (Beres, 
Senn, & McCaw, 2014). 
Another model of sexual consent proposed 
by Petersen and Muehlenhard (2007) considered 
that the internal decision to engage in sex is perhaps 
more complicated.  They offer the idea that sexual 
wantedness and sexual willingness are two different 
issues.  In their conceptualization, wantedness 
is a desire for a sexual activity while willingness 
indicates an agreement to engage in a specific act. 
This particular model allows for the decision-making 
of the subject to include many more options that are 
known to occur.  For example in this paradigm, a 
sexual encounter can include four general internal 
dispositions: 1. consensual and wanted sex, 2. 
consensual and unwanted sex, 3. non-consensual 
and wanted sex and 4. non-consensual and 
unwanted sex.  Jozkowski (2011) sees all of these as 
internalized processes—consent being an internal 
decision involving both desire and willingness (or 
not) that is then made external or transparent to the 
partner or not.
Consenting to unwanted sex is a rather 
common experience.  In one study, 50% of women 
and 26% of men in committed relationships were 
found to have consented to unwanted sex (O’Sullivan 
& Allgeier, 1998).  Consenting to unwanted sex 
occurs for a number of reasons: The desire to 
satisfy a partner’s needs which conflict with one’s 
own; promoting intimacy; avoiding relationship 
tension; avoiding hurt feelings; feeling obligated; 
and, enhancing the sexual relationship (Reneau 
& Muehlenhard, 2005).  The phenomenon is so 
common that new terminology has been coined 
to define aspects of this experience.  For example, 
compliant sex was coined by Walker (1997) or when 
experienced as a way of maintaining a relationship, 
maintenance sex (Cossman, 2007; Plaxton, 2015; 
Poehler, 2014).
In viewing sexual consent as having 
a number of components such as desire and 
willingness to engage in the behavior, Williams 
et al. (2014) considered yet another component: 
value or expected outcome.  This is particularly 
salient because one often consents to activities not 
having had the benefit of hindsight to know how 
they will turn out.  This is easily understood by 
considering the example of BDSM/Kink.  Williams 
et al. (2014) considered consent in this context on 
three levels: Surface consent (i.e., the verbal yes or 
no to engage in activity), scene consent (consenting 
to and negotiating the mechanics of in-scene 
communication), and deep consent.  For Williams 
et al., deep consent encompasses an awareness of 
the deeper, unknown psychological aspects of an 
activity—that will only be available to analyze and 
discuss in hindsight, after the scene is complete.  It 
is in this retrospective analysis that the interpretation 
of an activity can influence a person’s view of their 
own consent, which is related to hindsight bias, 
widely studied in decision-making literature on risk 
and uncertainty (Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff & Beyth, 
1975).
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Humphreys and Brousseau (2010) 
conceptualized consent on two continua: verbal 
to nonverbal and direct to indirect.  They noted 
the varied ways that that consent has been found 
to be communicated, including:  A verbal question 
and answer; smiling, pulling toward; touching; or, 
other nonverbal cues that communicate willingness 
to engage in sexual activity.  Consent is then also 
assessed by directness (referencing the explicit 
activity; e.g., “Do you want to have sex with me?”) 
or indirectness (more nuanced hints at an activity; 
e.g., “Would you like to go upstairs?”).  The more 
subtle, nuanced acceptance or rejection of sexual 
invitations in conjunction with perceived sexual 
scripts or gender roles have more potential to 
cause confusion or be misinterpreted (Jozkowski 
et al., 2014).  In a study of college students and 
sexual consent by Hickman and Muehlenhard 
(1999), responses were classified as: 1. Direct 
verbal communication; 2. Direct nonverbal 
communication; 3. Indirect verbal communication; 
4. Indirect nonverbal communication; 5. 
Intoxication; and 6. No response signals.  Some 
researchers argue that unless a refusal of sexual 
willingness is communicated directly and verbally, 
it may be miscommunicated (Burkett & Hamilton, 
2012; O’Byrne, Hansen, & Rapley, 2008; O’Byrne, 
Rapley, & Hansen, 2006; Starfelt, Young, Palk, & 
White, 2015).  Cultural and individual meanings of 
both words and gestures can further complicate 
understanding and clarity of subtle communications 
hence the goal of educators to urge people to use 
direct verbal means.
Some researchers have identified consent 
as an ongoing, continuous process (Beres, 2014; 
Humphreys, 2004).  Consent is something given or 
obtained and can be renewed as sexual behavior 
continues.  Signs given for a partner to continue—
termed “active participation” by Beres (2010, p. 8) 
—communicate to a partner that one is engaged 
in and consenting as the sexual activity progresses. 
People check for this ongoing consent in social 
cues that indicate enjoyment and comfort, rather 
than discomfort (Beres, 2010).  This process of being 
open and aware to the communications of desires 
in an ongoing manner is what Pineau (1989) called 
“communicative sexuality” (p. 235).
Consent communication has even deeper 
components that are understudied.  Researchers 
have raised many philosophical issues: What of 
consenting to the act one imagines will be enjoyable 
and then the act is not in actuality anything like how 
one imagines but is technically the act to which one 
consented? Does this constitute lack of consent? 
Does one consent to an act?  Or does one consent 
to attempting to approximate the fantasy of what that 
act may be?  What occurs when one is ambivalent? 
For some, ambivalent desire can change (in both 
directions) with ongoing activity.  Even when one 
communicates directly (which is subjectively 
understood), what does “have sex” mean?  Does it 
have a contextual definition or does it require more 
discussion each time? These questions and more 
remain. 
The communication of consent, regardless, 
is a complex process.  Beres (2007) pointed to the 
ambiguity with which researchers discuss sexual 
consent.  Calling the phenomenon “spontaneous 
consent,” she noted that many researchers simply 
assume that there is a common understanding of 
consent in the field.  While the explicit definition 
remains simultaneously multitudinous and elusive, 
the reliance on an assumed understanding, suggests 
an ontological reality of the phenomenon. 
The above discussion of consent as an 
ongoing, continuous process of communicating 
one’s desire and willingness to engage in sexual 
activity is the clearest manifestation of the 
phenomenology of consent as it is lived in the sexual 
science literature.  Beres and Farvid (2010) analyzed 
young heterosexual women’s engagement in casual 
sex in the context of Foucault’s rapport à soi—or the 
relationship one has with oneself.  In their study, they 
found women exhibited “care for the self” when they 
exhibited a unity of desire and action—engaging 
in sexuality when they desired it, and refusing or 
setting limits when they did not want to engage in 
sexual activity.  Consistent with Foucault’s sexual 
ethics, Beres and Farvid (2010) contextualized these 
women’s experiences as acting in accordance with 
their beliefs.  This process of knowing and acting in 
accordance with one’s internal desires in connection 
with another willing and engaged other through 
time, is not often discussed or contextualized in the 
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embodied relationship that one has with the self 
and others. What follows is a discussion of some of 
the philosophical ideas from the phenomenological 
and transpersonal traditions that might be used to 
consider these notions of consent more deeply.
Sexual Consent and Phenomenology
Sexual consent can be considered through the phenomenological philosophical idea of 
intentionality, or an instance of consciousness of 
something.  For Husserl, intentionality is the process 
through which consciousness directs itself toward 
an object (in this case, another person who may 
or not be consenting to sex) in the outside world, 
and makes meaning (Zahavi, 2003).  What is 
critically important here is the idea that for Husserl, 
“intentionality is not merely a feature of one's 
consciousness of actually existing objects, but also 
something that characterizes fantasies, predictions, 
recollections and so forth and that Husserl also 
argued that the intended object is not itself a part of 
or contained in consciousness” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 19). 
This implies that the object in question may or may 
not exist in actuality and this is a critical issue when 
it comes to consent. For example, if consciousness 
directs itself toward an object understood as sexual 
consent, this can be a fantasy insofar as in actuality 
consent is not at all how the other person is living 
the experience.  Husserl discussed these issues by 
suggesting that “all consciousness is consciousness 
of something as something. In this way the matter 
specifies the object as this object in a certain way. 
It delivers the ‘interpretive sense’ of the object” 
(Gallagher, 2012, p. 67).
Husserl also discussed active and passive 
forms of intentionality.  Intentionality in an active 
sense, directs itself toward the outside object—
grasps objects given to consciousness—and names 
them for consciousness through the interpretive 
sense discussed above.  However, intentionality 
in the passive sense is pre-theoretical, is always 
intending, is constituting and constituted by the 
object it intends.  Husserl described the relationship 
between active and passive synthesis in a great 
deal of detail but to summarize for this discussion, 
he noted, “what was ‘pre-theoretically’ conscious 
and objective comes ‘properly’ to consciousness 
in its own objectivity in the subsequent ‘unveiling’ 
reflective theoretical grasp” (1912/1989, p. 13).  This 
is important relative to sexual consent in that it 
allows for the idea not only that one can misinterpret 
consent but also that one can potentially experience 
either desire or willingness but these experiences—
desire or willingness—may not even be named 
for oneself in the moment and as such will not be 
available for articulation to a partner if they are 
passively intended.
Building on Husserl’s ideas, Merleau-
Ponty (1945/2012) in his discussion of the 
passive intentionality of sexuality in particular, in 
Phenomenology of Perception, suggested first that all 
subjects of intentionality are body-subjects, making 
the point that consciousness is fundamentally 
embodied.  He then posited that all sexuality is the 
“body-subject’s concrete, spatial and pre-reflective 
directedness towards the lived world” (Merleau-
Ponty, as cited by Reuter, 1999, p. 71).  What is 
most interesting for the current discussion of sexual 
consent is the pre-reflective and embodied quality 
of consciousness Merleau-Ponty described.  He 
continued, 
Insofar as I have hands, feet, a body, I 
sustain around me intentions which are 
not dependent on my decisions and which 
affect my surroundings in a way that I do not 
choose.  This isn’t accomplished through will or 
intellectualization but through conversations or 
gesture (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, p. 440).
Many theorists in the sexual science 
literature on consent, noted above, also discuss the 
embodied quality of sexual consent that is sometimes 
communicated through conversation or through 
gesture (Humphreys & Brusseau, 2010; Muehlenhard, 
1995/1996; Muehlenhard, Humphreys, Jozkowski, 
& Peterson, 2016). Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012) 
pointed out, specifically, that sexual intentionality is 
not a decision that is considered in a reflective (or 
actively intended) manner per se, nor is the intention 
necessarily going to impact the surroundings (in this 
case, another body-subject) in the desired manner. 
Instead it is passively intended and existing in an 
embodied and lived manner in relationship to 
another subject who also has intentionality directed 
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toward the lived world in both passive and active 
forms.  For Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012), “[t]here is 
an erotic ‘comprehension’ that is not of the order 
of the understanding, given that the understanding 
comprehends by seeing an experience under an 
idea whereas desire comprehends blindly by linking 
one body to another” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, 
p. 159).  The embodied experience of eroticism as 
passively intended is thus implicated in Merleau-
Ponty’s description as separate and distinct from 
the processes of deciding, reflecting upon, or 
understanding in the cognitive sense. 
Returning to the issue of consent in the sexual 
science literature, as discussed above, the multitude 
of definitions of consent as a process of deciding and 
articulating to the other this decision in a concrete 
manner at a moment in time are largely inconsistent 
with the thinking of Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012) 
and with phenomenological understandings of the 
issue.  The idea of consent as a verbal or gesture 
of acceptance, desire, or willingness to engage 
that is lived in an embodied sense at a particular 
moment in time is consistent with his thinking and 
with phenomenological understandings of lived 
experience.  Dillon (1987) discussed this issue and 
argued that erotic temporality, in particular, includes 
a reciprocal synchronous opening of one to another 
in an embodied manner in the moment.  He noted 
that once the reciprocity or synchronous quality 
ends, eroticism takes a turn for at least one of the 
participants if not both to another meaning (e.g., 
unwanted touching, lack of desire; Dillon, 1987). 
For Husserl (1920/2001), “streaming consciousness 
[through time] constantly projects a protentional 
horizon ahead of itself, … expectations can really 
only be fulfilled through perceptions.  Thus, they are 
also essentially susceptible to disappointment” (p. 
263) . . . and surprise.  For this reason, consent to an 
act (which will be ongoing as a series of moments 
in time) is not possible because consciousness is 
always lived through time both projecting forward in 
the form of fantasies and desires but also living in the 
moment in the form of experience and embodiment. 
To illustrate this point more clearly, consent 
to the entirety of an act includes anticipation of how 
the act will proceed from the moment of consent 
into the future as noted above.  Anticipation is a 
different quality of consciousness than the pre-
reflective quality of passive synthesis described 
above.  It is precisely this quality of anticipation that 
constitutes the experience as a protentional horizon 
ahead of itself as distinct from the state of embodied 
eroticism that occurs in the moment linking two 
bodies together as Merleau-Ponty describes.  As the 
moments pass in real-time from the beginning of a 
sexual act, there may be a set of different embodied 
passively experienced intentions, which are 
sometimes actively synthesized, in each moment.
Perception brings something new … . Potentially, 
the motivation can be evident to me and it can 
be of a force that outweighs all counter forces; 
it may even happen that no counter forces are 
at work, and further, that none of them can be 
exhibited in the past.  But it is certainly clear 
that it is a perception that first decides, and that 
something new can be a slap in the face to all 
expectation (Husserl, 1920/2001, p. 263).  
He continued, “The ego living toward the future 
also naturally experiences what arrives right at the 
moment when it has become present and when the 
ego actually perceives it” (1920/2001, p. 264).  Some 
of these moments may include in the case of a sexual 
act, a dissipation of eroticism, or distractions, other 
shifts in intentionality (e.g., anxiety occurs, pain or 
discomfort occurs, one becomes aware of the dog 
barking incessantly and this occupies consciousness 
momentarily, one partner realizes they are too 
intoxicated to enjoy the sex they have just consented 
to, or an erection or lubrication are not sufficient) 
which may be experienced as something more 
like “the sex act to which I consented to in the 
past and anticipated I would desire in the future is 
now no longer the sex act I wish to consent to part-
way through the act in the moment.”  It can also 
be the opposite experience whereby one or both 
participants anticipate specifically not wanting to 
engage in sex at all but instead embrace or caress 
one another and this is not experienced as erotic or 
sexual.  Perhaps then later they come to experience 
a shift in passive intentionality as described above. 
Through gesture (in this case an embrace), the initial 
consent is to touch one another in what is actively 
intended as a non-sexual manner, and only later 
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becomes “consent to have sex” as the perceptions 
of the moments that pass into the future animate the 
embodied passive intentions, somewhere afterward. 
Consent to an entire act, which in itself is comprised 
of a multitude of many moments each of which can 
include changes in feelings, desires, or dynamic 
responses from the partner or the environment, 
therefore in practice is only really consent to begin 
the act.  This consent is potentially available to be 
renewed or changed each moment. Consent could 
thus be redefined as the willingness or openness to 
engage in a sexual dialogue through words or gesture 
and could be renewed each moment throughout the 
temporal arc of the real-time embodied experience. 
This is most in alignment with the process-oriented 
understanding of consent suggested by Muehlenhard 
et al. (2016).
Buber and the Dialogic Aspects of Consent
Sexual consent—while being renewable in each moment—also requires that the pre-reflective 
embodied intentionality is accurately conveyed 
and read by the other(s) as consent moment to 
moment to participate in the same act, all the while 
that intentions might be pre-reflectively occurring 
for each of the participants. Here, Martin Buber’s 
(1932/2004) ideas of the I-Thou relationship are 
useful as illuminating dialogic engagement with 
the other as a full and complete subjectivity (which 
includes as Husserl would have it, a stream of 
intentionality occurring in each moment).  For Buber, 
there are two types of relationships: the I-It, which 
understands the world as comprised of objects in 
space and time, and the I-Thou, which are two-way 
dialogic relationships, characterized by mutuality, 
transcendence and presence.  Buber describes the 
present, “like the eternal now of the mystic, it is the 
present of intensity and wholeness and exists insofar 
as meeting and relation exist” (Friedman, 1960, p. 58). 
The Thou therefore, cannot be understood in terms 
of its location in a reductive temporal and causal 
framework.  I-Thou relationships are constituted in 
such relational encounters and named for Buber 
the between.  The between is difficult to describe 
because it, like with pre-reflective embodied passive 
synthesis, exists separately from reflection which 
makes the between the object of reflection, and 
is inconsistent with the notion itself.  According to 
Buber (1958), 
[Thou] … is not a thing among things and does 
not consist of things.  Thus human being is not 
He or She, bounded from every other He or She, 
a specific point in space and time within the net 
of the world….But with no neighbor, and whole 
in himself, he is Thou and fills the heavens.  This 
does not mean that nothing exists except himself. 
But all else lives in his light” (p. 8).  
This account of the I-Thou is a transcendent 
experience beyond the self and other and outside of 
time and space and as a function of deep presence.
For Buber, however, temporality and 
reflection inherently come to bear on the I-Thou 
experience, which is similar to how Husserl described 
the synthesis of consciousness as inherently toggling 
back and forth between active and passive synthesis. 
Buber noted that while I-Thou relationships are 
transcendent and expansive, the I-It experiences 
make possible the more mundane projects of living. 
“It is not possible to live in the bare present.  Life 
would be quite consumed if precautions were 
not taken to subdue the present” (Buber, 1958, p. 
34).  Buber also noted that while not every other 
is experienced for each I as a Thou, every I-Thou 
relationship must become an I-It relationship at some 
point, only to be available to return to an I-Thou at 
another point in time (Buber, 1958, pp. 16-17).  For 
Buber the willingness to be open to the possibility 
of an I-Thou relationship on the part of both parties 
is what makes it possible.  The specific quality of 
openness and willingness to enter into a dialogue 
of mutuality of two subjects is key to understanding 
the issue of sexual consent as a process of attending 
to the consciousness of the self and other in the 
moment as the moments pass.  Entering into the 
between, transcending the self to embrace a dialogic 
mutual space that is timeless and borne of presence, 
is required so that one can attend to the moment 
to moment passing stream of consciousness of the 
Thou as consenting.  
It may be helpful to offer an example.  If one 
notices one’s partner from across the table and notes 
that he or she is attractive, feels desire and imagines 
or anticipates a series of acts that may follow, this 
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is consistent with the I-It mode of relating.  In this 
moment while there is interest in the other, the focus 
is on the subjective experience of one’s own desires 
and not necessarily have the desires of the other 
as his or her own subjectivity been engaged.  One 
might be conscious of the need at that same moment 
to suspend this fantasy and put the children to bed 
or tend to guests or some other mundane task and 
again the I-It mode of relating makes it possible to 
attend to the responsibilities of social life and home 
life, for example.  It is only later, with willingness that 
one comes to open to the possibility of the other and 
his or her subjectivity, allowing for the possibility 
for an I-Thou relationship through presence that 
a transformation can occur.  It is this willingness, 
and welcoming of the full subjectivity of the other 
with his or her intentionality, that defines the I-Thou 
position.  And this position allows for a moment-to-
moment dialogic engagement with the subjectivity 
and its intentionality.  It is Buber’s framework of 
I-Thou that we offer here to deepen the discussion 
on sexual consent from a mere process of embodied 
intentionality to a willingness to be in dialogic 
presence to the other as the basis for transcendent 
sexual consent.
Discussion
Phenomenological understandings of intention-ality, embodied intentionality and active and 
passive synthesis when applied to the issue of sexual 
consent reveal the process by which as embodied 
pre-reflective conscious subjects we give consent 
as distinct from decision-making processes that can 
be articulated clearly and verbally.  This explains 
the gray areas that occur with respect to consent. 
The issues of anticipation, temporality, and changes 
in consciousness, between active (reflective) 
consciousness and passive synthesis that is always 
present, represents the potentiality for moment to 
moment changes in desire, willingness to engage 
and therefore, consent.  Sexual consent, therefore, 
can be phenomenologically understood as a process 
that is lived as each moment passes and cannot be 
conceived of as consent to an entire act through 
time for any particular subject.  
The complex issue of synchronous bi-
directional consent in the moment between two 
subjects (who are also objects of consciousness 
of the other), all the while that consciousness is 
engaging both actively and passively, requires, if 
we apply Buber’s ideas, a degree of willingness and 
openness in a reciprocal manner, to engage the 
other as a subject, at a particular moment in time, in 
his/her/their own right.  A stance that transcends the 
self in this manner, as in Buber’s I-Thou framework, 
is helpful for engaging the relational dialogical 
space that Buber called the between even if it is 
ephemeral.  One is able to access the between 
through willingness and openness to the other in 
dialogue in the moment, as the moments pass in pre-
reflective embodied engagement, if the other is also 
similarly willing to engage.  While likely peppered 
with moments of I-It relationality and distraction 
from the present moment within the totality of the 
entire experience of the sexual act, one is always 
able to renew the willingness and openness to the 
I-Thou and to consent anew through choice.  
While it might be preferable to have a 
notion of consent that is dependent on capacity to 
decide, freedom from coercion, based on decision-
making and clear verbal agreements for the entirety 
of the sexual act so as to avoid ambiguity and 
problems, from a phenomenological perspective, 
consciousness does not synthesize embodied pre-
reflective sexual intentions in a manner conducive 
to these ideas.  The phenomenological perspective 
coupled with Buber’s ideas of the between, helps 
to explain why studies show that most sexual 
consent is navigated nonverbally (Beres et al., 
2004; Hall, 1998; Hickman & Muehlenhard, 1999; 
Jozkowski & Peterson, 2013; Jozkowski & Wiersma, 
2015; Muehlenhard et al., 1992).  While consent 
as a decision to engage fully in an act throughout 
the entire act is not possible, the transpersonal 
reverence and presence to the moment and the 
Thou, discussed by Buber is what provides the 
transcendence of the self through the I-Thou 
relationship into the between.  From within this 
stance mutual dialogic engagement in each moment 
allows for ongoing renewed consent.  
In some respects, research has identified 
this concept of consent as ongoing (Beres, 2010; 
Beres, 2014; Humphreys, 2004) and that some 
educators and scholars have identified important 
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skills needed to assess for consent in an ongoing-
manner (Jozkowski, 2015; Pineau, 1989).  Some 
educators are also designing (Carmody, 2015) and 
assessing (Carmody, 2015) programs that begin 
to address these complexities, supplying skills for 
seeking and giving clarity in sexual encounters in an 
ongoing way.  With this deconstruction of consent, 
then, perhaps a greater number of educators might 
more uniformly aim to focus on developing skills and 
ethical perspectives that are aligned with helping 
people to become willing to engage in ongoing 
presence and dialogue with the other(s) with whom 
we engage sexually rather than on garnering a 
simple yes or no at a specific point in time.  With 
this phenomenological understanding of consent, a 
more nuanced discussion of sexual ethics providing 
deeper understandings of the responsibilities faced 
for engaging with others is warranted.
Conclusion
Through broadening the understanding of consent to sexual activity from a binary yes or no decision 
to engage in an entire sexual act, to an understanding 
of consent as an ongoing, continuous process 
of consciousness and dialogic engagement with 
another subject, we aim to describe how consent 
may be lived.  We also offer a direction for theorizing 
ethical engagement with another throughout this 
continuous lived process—expanding the discussion 
from “when a person gave some idealized version 
of pure consent” to “how consent was experienced 
throughout the arc of the temporal engagement with 
the other.”  If Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are correct 
in their analysis of consciousness and intentionality 
and Buber is correct in identifying a transcendent 
I-Thou relationship, then the focus for consent theory 
may well shift to willingness to engage the other in 
the I-Thou relationship rather than willingness to 
engage in a sexual act. 
The consequences of consent defined in 
this manner—a willingness to engage the other in 
an I-Thou relationship sexually—leaves room for 
many more possibilities than any of the options 
offered by the current sexual science literature 
and more accurately describes lived experiences 
of sexual engagement than is currently discussed 
in sexual science discourse. The experience of 
desire, willingness, and communication of consent 
in whatever manner it occurs is sometimes 
experienced pre-consciously or ambiguously and 
may change over time within the entire sexual act. 
For example, consent may also change as one comes 
to experience real-time what one just consented to 
based on how one imagined it would be in the future 
but now that the moment is occurring it is actually 
different than expected (either for better or worse). 
Perhaps many acts that are called consensual have 
moments of consent (desire and wantedness is 
present and it matches what one agentically made 
known to a partner in some fashion) and moments 
when one uses their agency to adjust from 
disappointing or uncomfortable sensations that 
were not anticipated, toward more clearly desired, 
and therefore consensual, experiences.  With an 
increased understanding of the phenomenology 
of consent, its temporal dimensions and the need 
for ongoing dialogic engagement with the other 
as a sexual subject, it becomes possible to better 
articulate and support experiences of ethical sexual 
engagement that deepen connections to oneself 
and others, and to allow for sexual transcendence 
to Buber’s between for moments at a time.  While 
we have only alluded to the willingness required 
to begin to enter the I-Thou, this suggests that a 
more thorough set of skills and activities to engage 
is perhaps warranted in teaching ethical sexual 
practices.  While this level of specificity is outside 
the scope of this paper and would require attention 
to the educational, psychological, and ethical 
aspects that are also present in sexual encounters, 
we believe that such a direction is worth pursuing 
and developing in future discussions.
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